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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
CaseNo.20040552-CA
vs.
ALAN REED FITZ,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred in finding that the evidence was sufficient to

establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Fitz did not act in self-defense? "A defendant
is entitled to an acquittal if based upon the whole evidence in the case there is a
reasonable doubt as to whether or not the defendant acted in self-defense." State v.
Jackson, 528 P.2d 145, 147 (Utah 1974). See also, State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695
(Utah 1980) (defendant has no particular burden of proof but is entitled to acquittal if
there is any basis in the evidence sufficient to create reasonable doubt). When reviewing
challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence from a bench trial this Court will reverse if
the findings are against the clear weight of the evidence, or if this Court "otherwise
reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." State v. Strieby,
790 P.2d 98, 100 (Utah App. 1990) (citations omitted). "This standard of review is less
deferential than that applied in a jury trial because of the multi-member versus single fact
1

finder, and requires that the evidence presented not be contrary to the verdict." Id. (citing
State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 786-87 (Utah 1988)).
This issue was preserved in an oral motion for directed verdict (R.41 at 31-38) and
during closing argument (R. 41 at 83-90).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-402
(1) A person is justified in threatening or using force against another when and to
the extent that he or she reasonably believes that force is necessary to defend
himself or a third person against such other's imminent use of unlawful force.
However, that person is justified in using force intended or likely to cause death or
serious bodily injury only if he or she reasonably believes that force is necessary to
prevent death or serious bodily injury to himself or a third person as a result of the
other's imminent use of unlawful force, or to prevent the commission of a forcible
felony.
(5) In determining imminence or reasonableness under Subsection (1), the trier of
fact may consider, but is not limited to, any of the following factors:
( a)

the nature of the danger;

(b )

the immediacy of the danger;

( c)

the probability that the unlawful force would result in death or

serious bodily injury
( d)

the other's prior violent acts or violent propensities; and

(e)

any patterns of abuse or violence in the parties' relationship

2

Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-109.1
(2) A person is guilty of child abuse is the person:
( c)

under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection

(2)(a) or (b), commits an act of domestic violence in the presence of a child.
(3)(b) A person who violates Subsection (2)( c ) is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor.

Utah Code Annotated § 77-36-1(2)
"Domestic violence" means any criminal offense involving violence or physical
harm or threat of violence or physical harm, or any attempt, conspiracy, or
solicitation to commit a criminal offense involving violence of physical harm,
when committed by one cohabitant against another. "Domestic violence also
means commission or attempt to commit, any of the following offenses by one
cohabitant against another:
(b) assault, as described in Section 76-5-102....

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Alan Reed Fitz appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the

Fourth District Court after he was convicted of assault, a class B misdemeanor, and
domestic violence in the presence of a child, a class B misdemeanor.

B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
Alan Fitz was charged by information filed in Fourth District Court on October 29,
3

2003, with assault, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-5102(1); domestic violence in the presence of a child, a class B misdemeanor, in violation
of Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-109. l(2)c), and reckless endangerment, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-112 (R. 9).
On April 21, 2004, a bench trial was held before the Honorable Derek P. Pullan
(R. 23-24, 41). At the close of the State's case, Fitz motioned the trial court for a directed
verdict on all counts (R. 41 at 31-38). After deliberation, Judge Pullan denied the motion
as to count I (assault) and count II (domestic violence in the presence of a child) and
dismissed count III (reckless endangerment) (R. 23, 41 at 50-52).
After presentation of all the evidence, Fitz argued to the trial court that the State
did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not act in self-defense and that
therefore, he must be acquitted on the assault charge. (R. 41 at 83-90). Fitz also argued,
accordingly, that if he had not committed any underlying criminal act then he could not be
convicted of committing domestic violence in the presence of a child (R. 41 at 90). After
taking the matter under advisement, Judge Pullan convicted Fitz on both charged finding
that "the State has met its burden of proof that they have convinced me beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense" (R. 41 at 92).
On May 26, 2004, Fitz was sentenced to 18 months court probation. As part of his
probation, Fitz was ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $500.00 and to spend 10 days
in the work diversion program at the Utah County Jail (R. 30-31). Fitz was also ordered
to complete a domestic violence assessment at DCFS and to follow through with any
recommended treatment (Id.).
On June 25, 2004, Fitz filed a notice of appeal with the Fourth District Court (R.
38).
4

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
A. Testimony of Deputy JoAnn Murphy
On September 26, 2003, at approximately 3 a.m., JoAnn Murphy and Jodi Scott,
deputies in the Utah County Sheriffs office, were dispatched to 1803 Cedar Street, Eagle
Mountain (R. 41 at 8-11). Brenda Fitz answered the door carrying a crying two-week old
baby and invited the officers into the home (R. 41 at 11, 18). Brenda was also crying (R.
41 at 13). At the time the officers came into the residence, Alan Fitz was slouched into an
easy chair (R. 41 at 13, 21). Alan was "groggy, almost asleep" (Id.).
Based upon the "level of agitation on the lady's face, her crying, the baby crying,
[Deputy Murphy] determined that there appeared to have been some type of altercation
that took place in the residence" (R. 41 at 13). Murphy testified that she was told by both
parties-Alan and Brenda-that they were married (R. 41 at 14).
Murphy testified that she removed Brenda from the residence and spoke with her
outside while another deputy spoke with Alan inside the residence (R. 41 at 15-16).
Subsequently, the deputies traded places and Murphy went inside and spoke with Alan
(R. 41 at 16). The officers then got together and "compared notes, compared stories"
before making a determination on how to proceed (R. 41 at 16).
Murphy testified that Alan
had been asleep on the couch, that his wife had been nagging him, that she
had been yelling at him and he was trying to ignore her. He indicated that
she reached down and slapped him [with an open hand] and he lost his
temper, said he came off the couch and punched her several times while she
was holding the baby
(R. 41 at 16-17, 22). Murphy was not aware of any physical altercation which took place
5

before Brenda slapped Alan (R. 41 at 22).
In response to a question about whether the baby was in Brenda's arms at the time
of the altercation, Murphy testified: "In my interview with him, [Alan] stated, 'I know I
shouldn't have done it. I just lost my temper.' He knew that she was holding the baby
while he was hitting her" (R. 41 at 20) K However, no recording of the conversation was
made and Murphy acknowledged that she doesn't know exactly what Alan said, but she
believes he was acknowledging remorse for his response and his awareness that Brenda
was holding the baby (R. 41 at 25-26).
Murphy testified that she observed red marks on Brenda's arms and shoulders (R.
41 at 17, 23). Murphy testified that the red marks appeared to be "defensive type of
injuries" (R. 41 at 18). Murphy testified that she took photographs of the red marks but
"they did not turn out" (R. 41 at 24). Murphy acknowledged that she had not seen an
adult who has suffered a substantial injury from a punch to an arm (R. 41 at 26).
Murphy testified that she could not recall seeing a red mark on Alan's face (R. 41
at 26). Murphy acknowledged that people can be dazed and confused upon be awoken
(R. 41 at 29).
Ultimately, the officers decided that Alan was the "primary aggessor" and he was
arrested for assault (d.v.) and domestice violence in the presence of a child (R. 41 at 16).
Murphy identified Fitz at court but admitted on cross-examination that prior to trial
she asked another public defender if he was Fitz (R. 41 at 21).
Alan and Brenda divorced sometime between this incident and the trial (R. 41 at ).

!

On cross-examination, Murphy testified more specifically that "In my interview
with him in our discussion, I asked him, 'You realize you've hit your wife while she's
holding your child?' He stated clearly, 'I know I shouldn't have done it, but I lost my
temper.'"
6

Brenda moved to Wyoming (R. 41 at). She was issued a subpoena but chose not to
attend the trial (R. 17-18, 41).

B. Testimony of Alan Fitz
Alan testified that on the night in question, the baby awoke and Brenda got her and
turned on the bedroom light (R. 41 at 66). This disturbed Alan and he told Brenda that he
was going to sleep on the living room couch (R. 41 at 66). A verbal dispute started as he
walked out of the bedroom and Brenda came out of the bedroom and was yelling at Alan
while he lay on the couch (R. 41 at 67-68). Alan testified that he did not know how long
the yelling continued because he "fell asleep" at approximately 2:15-2:30 a.m. (R. 41 at
68).
While he was sleeping on the couch, he was awaken by being struck or slapped
across the face (R. 41 at 54). Alan testified that he woke up dazed and that he did not
know exactly what had happened or why it happened (Id.). He initially thought he had
been struck by an object but subsequently discovered a red mark on his face and realized
he had been slapped by an open hand (R. 41 at 54-57).
Alan testified that the slap hurt and that he woke up dazed and afraid that he might
be hit again (R. 41 at 57-58). There are no lights in the living room (R. 41 at 75).
Initially Alan thought there might be an intruder in the home (R. 41 at 58). Alan testified:
"At first I didn't know if it was Brenda or if somebody broke in, and I got up and the first
person I saw was Brenda. She-I don't recall if she backed up or walked-turned and
walked forward, but she sat down in the corner of the love seat, and she had [the baby]
next to her. I grabbed her arm and I socked her in the shoulder" (R. 41 at 63-64). The
love seat is next to the couch in an L-formation with a path way between the two (R. 41 at
7

72). Alan denied telling the officers that Brenda was holding the baby but testified that
the baby was next to her on the love seat (R. 41 at 72). The distance from where Alan
was sleeping to the love seat is 6-10 feet (R. 41 at 73). As Alan got up from the couch,
Brenda was moving toward the love seat (R. Rl at 75).
Alan acknowledged that he punched her twice on the right shoulder and once on
the left shoulder (R. 41 at 64). Alan then realized what was happening and went into the
bedroom and locked the door until the police came (R. 41 at 64).
Alan testified that Brenda had slapped and punched him on 8-9 different occasions
during their 2.5 year marriage (R. 41 at 60). On each occasion she had struck him more
than once (R. 41 at 61). Alan had to restrain her in the past when she hit him (R. 41 at
63). On Halloween of 2001, Alan testified that Brenda was "hitting me" and she "started
breaking things around the house, and she called the police on me, and I-you know, I've
never hit her before" (R. 41 at 61-62). The police came and Brenda was arrested and
taken into custody for assault (R. 41 at 64-65). Brenda also had spent 1.5 years in the
Utah State Hospital R. 41 at (62-63).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Alan asserts that the trial court erred in its conclusion that the State proved beyond
a reasonable doubt that he did not act in self-defense. Alan asserts that the trial court's
findings are against the clear weight of the evidence and that this Court should have a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made and that the evidence presented
is contrary to Judge Pullan's verdict. Accordingly, because Alan's assault against Brenda
was justified as self-defense, the trial court erred in convicting him of assault and of
domestic violence in the presence of a child. For a conviction of domestic violence in the
8

presence of a child, a class B misdemeanor, an act of domestic violence must occur in the
presence of a child. Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-109.1(2)( c). Utah Code Annotated §
77-36-1(2) defines "domestic violence" as a criminal offense-including. Because Alan
committed no underlying criminal offense, he cannot be guilty of domestic violence in the
presence of a child.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE STATE HAD
PROVED BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT ALAN'S CONDUCT WAS
NOT JUSTIFIED AS SELF-DEFENSE.
Alan Fitz asserts that the court erred in finding that the evidence was sufficient to
establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he did not act in self-defense. "A defendant is
entitled to an acquittal if based upon the whole evidence in the case there is a reasonable
doubt as to whether or not the defendant acted in self-defense." State v. Jackson, 528
P.2d 145, 147 (Utah 1974). See also, State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1980)
(defendant has no particular burden of proof but is entitled to acquittal if there is any
basis in the evidence sufficient to create reasonable doubt).
When reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence from a bench trial
this Court will reverse if the findings are against the clear weight of the evidence, or if
this Court "otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made." State v. Strieby, 790 P.2d 98, 100 (Utah App. 1990) (citations omitted). "This
standard of review is less deferential than that applied in a jury trial because of the multimember versus single fact finder, and requires that the evidence presented not be contrary
to the verdict." Id. (citing State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 786-87 (Utah 1988)).
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Alan was charged with assault, domestic violence and child endangerment for
punching his wife, Brenda, in the shoulders after she, unprovoked, slapped him across the
face as he slept on the couch at 3 a.m. Brenda had red marks on her shoulders and arms.
Brenda chose not to testify at trial. Alan claimed at trial that he committed no crime
because he acted in self-defense. Judge Pullan acquitted Alan of child endangerment and
convicted him of assault and domestic violence in the presence of a child. Specifically,
Judge Pullan found:
... Having considered the testimony, the Court in this matter, [notes] for the
record that there is no question that on September 26, 2003, the defendant
committed an act that caused bodily injury to Brenda Fitz.... The only question
before the Court is whether or not the force used by [Alan] Fitz was lawful.
That requires the Court to determine whether or not his acts were justified
under Section 76-2-402 of the Utah Code. Subsection (1) of that statute provides
that, "A person is justified in using force against another when and to the extent
that he reasonably believes that force is necessary to defend himself against
another's imminent use of unlawful force."
Under that statute the defendant's belief must be reasonable as to the time
that force is used, and to the extent that force is used.
In determining in whether his belief was reasonable, I am to consider the
factors set forth in subsection (5). I can also consider those same factors in
determining whether or not continued force by Brenda Fitz was imminent.
In this matter there is no question that Brenda Fitz committed an act of
domestic violence, that she initiated at least the ph>sical portion of the
confrontation by striking the defendant as he slept on the couch. The issue before
10

the Court that I have to determine is whether or not continued violence on her part
was imminent and whether or not the defendant's belief as to the force that he used
in response was reasonable.
So considering the factors under subsection (5) the nature of the danger
posed to the defendant was minimal. Ms. Fitz slapped him with an open hand on
the face. It was a single slap. As to the immediacy of the danger, Ms. Fitz
retreated then to the couch. She sat down immediately next to a child who had
been born approximately two weeks earlier.
There was no probability that the force used by Ms. Fitz would cause death
or serious bodily injury. It's true that... that Ms. Fitz had some violent propensities
and had engaged in prior acts of violence against the defendant. The testimony is
that those acts occurred by way of slapping approximately every two weeks for a
substantial period of time, and that during the two-and-one-half year marriage he
had been punched eight to nine times by Ms. Fitz. He further testified that he hand
never struck her.
There was a pattern of abuse in the relationship. However, balancing the
first three factors against those two, in considering that this event was not in
accordance with that pattern of conduct, I am convinced that the State has met its
burden of proof that they have convinced me beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant did not act in self defense.
For that reason I am going to find the defendant guilty as to Counts I and II
of the Information
(R. 41 at 92-94).
Alan asserts that the trial court's findings are against the clear weight of the
11

evidence and that this Court should reach a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been made. Strieby, 790 P.2d at 100. "This standard of review is less deferential than
that applied in a jury trial because of the multi-member versus single fact finder, and
requires that the evidence presented not be contrary to the verdict." Id. (citation omitted).
Moreover, Fitz has no burdern proof but is "entitled to an acquittal if based upon the
whole evidence in the case there is a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the defendant
acted in self-defense." State v. Jackson, 528 P.2d 145, 147 (Utah 1974). See also, State
v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1980) (defendant has no particular burden of proof but
is entitled to acquittal if there is any basis in the evidence sufficient to create reasonable
doubt).
Utah Code Annotated § 76-2-402(1) states that "A person is justified in
threatening or using force against another when and to the extent that he or she
reasonably believes that force is necessary to defend himself or a third person against
such other's imminent use of unlawful force." The factors in subsection (5), referenced
by Judge Pullan, which the trier of fact may use in its determination of imminence or
reasonableness, are as follows: One, "the nature of the danger." Two, "the immediacy of
the danger." Three, "the probability that the unlawful force would result in death or
serious bodily injury." Four, "the other's prior violent acts or violent propensities." Five,
"any patterns of abuse or violence in the parties' relationship." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2402(5).
Alan has marshaled the evidence in his statement of the facts and will review that
marshaling here as necessary to his argument.
One, Judge Pullan found "the nature of the danger posed to the defendant was
minimal. Ms. Fitz slapped him with an open hand on the face. It was a single slap" (R.
12

41 at 93). While it is true that Brenda executed a single, open hand slap to Alan's face,
Alan asserts that trial court ignored other pieces of evidence which are relevant to a
consideration of the "nature of the danger." First, in the past when Brenda has struck
Alan, she frequently struck him multiple times and that she had to be restrained (R. 41 at
60, 61, 63). The fact that she had only slapped him once on this occasion does not mean
that he was not in danger of more assaultive behavior from Brenda. Subsection (1) only
requires that Alan reasonably believe that force is necessary to defend himself against
Brenda's imminent use of unlawful force. An unprovoked slap to a sleeping individual's
face is unlawful. Sleep, Alan asserts, is when an individual is at there most vulnerable
and the first initial moments following a sudden (and painful) awakening are confusing
which may affect an individual's perception of events.
Moreover, in this case Brenda was the aggressor. The trial court correctly found
that she committed an act of (uncharged) domestic violence and was the initiator of the
physical confrontation (R. 41 at 93). Utah Code Annotated § 76-2-402(2)(c)(I) indicates
that a person who is the aggressor is not entitled to make a claim of self-defense for the
use of force. "An aggressor is one who willingly and knowingly initially provokes a
combat or does acts of such a nature as would ordinarily lead to combat." State v.
Schoenfeld, 545 P.2d 193, 196 (Utah 1976). See also, State v. Starts, 627 P.2d 88, 90
(Utah 1981). Additionally, "if one who initially was a nonaggressor escalates a fight
beyond a level which would be justified in view of the nature of the original provocation,
then he loses the right to claim the defense of self-defense. Starks, 627 P.2d at 90
(citation omitted). Brenda's act was one of knowing provocation that would ordinarily
lead to combat. Alan asserts that he did not escalate the nature of the incident beyond a
level which would be justified under Brenda's original provocation. Brenda slapped him
13

across the face while he slept. When he awoke suddenly, he was in pain and he was
dazed. Punching her on the shoulder three times in approximately the first 6 seconds after
he awoke (R. 41 at 58, 69) is reasonable and justified.
Two, the trial court found that "as to the immediacy o f the danger, Ms. Fitz
retreated then to the couch. She sat down immediately next t o a child who had been born
approximately two weeks earlier." Alan testified that when h e was getting up from the
couch after being suddenly awakened from a blow to the face, Brenda was moving
towards the love seat, which is next to the couch approximately 6-10 feet away (R. 41 at
63-64, 75). The trial court failed to consider the timing and immediacy of Alan's
response which took place in a matter of a few seconds (R. 4 1 at 58, 69). The fact that
she was moving away from him in these circumstances does not negate his reasonable
belief as to the immediacy of the danger-including whether h e was going to be struck by
her again or initially whether there was an intruder in the home. As the aggressor, if she
had been cited for assault, then she could only claim self-defense if she had "withdraw[n]
from the encounter and effectively communicate[d] [to Alan her] intent to do so." Utah
Code Annotated § 76-2-402(2)( c )(I). Brenda may have been moving away from Alan
but it was only seconds after she assaulted him out of sleep and in the process she clearly
communicated no intent to withdraw from the encounter.
Three, Judge Pullan found that there was "no probability that the force used by Ms.
Fitz would cause death or serious bodily injury" (R. 41 at 94). Alan acknowledges that
the probability of serious bodily injury or death from a slap across the face is slight,
however, he was in a very vulnerable position when that blow to the face unexpectedly
occurred. In addition, the ensuing confusion from being so suddenly and drastically
awakened likely affected his ability to perceive, in the short time between the blow and
14

his response, the likelihood of such an injury.
Four, Judge Pullan correctly found that Brenda had violent propensities and that
she had engaged in prior acts of violence against Alan; and that he had previously, never
physically struck her in response.
Five, Judge Pullan also correctly found that there was a pattern of abuse in the
relationship. Alan asserts that the pattern was that she was the aggressor and the
perpetrator and he was the victim. Utah Code Annotated § 77-36-1(3) defines "victim" as
a cohabitant who has been subjected to domestic violence.
However, Alan asserts that Judge Pullan was mistaken in finding that the first
three factors weighed against a finding of reasonableness or imminence. Alan asserts that
all five factors weigh in favor of a conclusion that his belief that force was necessary to
defend himself against Brenda's imminent use of unlawful force. Alan asserts that the
trial court's findings are against the clear weight of the evidence and that this Court
should have a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made and that the
evidence presented is contrary to Judge Pullan's verdict.
Accordingly, because Alan's assault against Brenda was justified as self-defense,
the trial court erred in convicting him of assault and of domestic violence in the presence
of a child. For a conviction of domestic violence in the presence of a child, a class B
misdemeanor, an act of domestic violence must occur in the presence of a child. Utah
Code Annotated § 76-5-109.1(2)( c ). Utah Code Annotated § 77-36-1(2) defines
"domestic violence" as a criminal offense-including. Because Alan committed no
underlying criminal offense, he cannot be guilty of domestic violence in the presence of a
child.

15

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons, Fitz asks that this Court conclude that trial counsel
erred in determining that his action was not justified as self-defense pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated § 76-2-402. Accordingly, Fitz asks that this Court reverse his
convictions for assault and domestic violence in the presence of a child because the
evidence was insufficient to establish-beyond a reasonable doubt-that he did not act in
self-defense.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25th day of February, 2005.

MARGAFfkET t. LINDS,
Counsel for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed, first-class mail postage pre-paid, four (4) true and
correct copies of the foregoing Brief Of Appellant to Donna Kelly, Deputy Utah County
Attorney, 100 East Center Street, Suite 2100, Provo, Utah 84606 this 25th day of
February, 2005.
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